Social capital and coping with economic shocks: an analysis of stunting of South African children. Moreover, Carter and Maluccio ( 2003 Carter, M. Social capital: The World Bank's fungible friend. It ain't social, it ain't capital and it ain't Africa. For a critical appraisal of the concept of social capital, and how it has been interpreted and used in the social sciences, refer to Fine ( 2002 Fine, B. ) consider endogenous formation of risk sharing groups in an economic experiment and also conclude ‘genetically related individuals tend to distrust one another and so do not group when enforcement depends on intrinsic motivations alone’.ĥ. “ Risk sharing relations and enforcement mechanisms”. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 61(2): 133– 157. On kin-groups and wages in the Ghanaian labor market. For a theoretical model highlighting entry barriers for kin members in a modernising society, refer to Hoff and Sen (2006) and for empirical work on nepotism in Ghana, refer to Collier and Garg ( 1999 Collier, P. But if nepotism is costly for organisations and firms, and can be anticipated, the odds that a kinship member will actually be promoted to positions of authority will decline (or the terms associated with the position will deteriorate). If successful kinship members achieve positions of responsibility they may be expected to provide jobs for less fortunate (and possibly less qualified) relatives. : 66) write ‘the system … minimises the inducement for people to improve their position because they can count on being provided with the means of subsistence at a level not very different from that of the majority of their kinsmen, including the energetic, thrifty and able.’ Another avenue via which sharing norms may have adverse economic consequences is nepotism. The Economics of Under-developed Countries, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. For example, Bauer and Yamey ( 1957 Bauer, P. There are the usual moral hazard problems associated with the provision of (mutual) insurance against contingencies. : 78) is explicit about this as well: ‘to fail in kinship obligation is to be a witch … , in other words to be the opposite of a moral being: a murderer, a bestialist, a lover of death, etc.’ģ. In The Character of Kinship, Edited by: Goody, J. “ The long term and the short term: the economic and political significance of the morality of kinship”. Writing about the Merina of Madagascar, Bloch ( 1973 Bloch, M. ) discusses the evolution of sharing norms, and the role of witchcraft and other social sanctions to support them. Institutions, Social Norms and Economic Development, Amsterdam: Harwood. However, the compulsory sharing paradigm goes a step further. ,, : 1167) writes that ‘the ties of common experience, altruism and heritage among family members enable families to transcend some of the information problems barring the development of impersonal markets’. Risk, implicit contracts and the family in rural areas of low-income countries. Group formation in risk-sharing arrangements. , ), and group stability in the context of risk-sharing among subgroups (Genicot and Ray, 2003 Genicot, G. Mutual insurance and limited commitment: theory and evidence in village economies. ,, ), non-stationary transfers (Ligon et al., 2002 Ligon, E., Thomas, J. Review of Economics and Statistics, 83(3): 389– 407. Imperfect commitment, altruism, and the family: evidence from transfer behavior in low-income rural areas. Extensions of the seminal paper by Coate and Ravallion include work accommodating altruism among individuals (especially kin members) by Foster and Rosenzweig ( 2001 Foster, A.
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